On June 21, 2004, the Supreme Court held inAetna Health
Inc. v. Davila' that the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA)2 preempted two Texas
patients' state tort law claims against their respective
Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) for injuries
allegedly caused by the HMOs' failure to exercise
reasonable care in making utilization review decisions.3
This decision effectively shields HMOs from most (or all)
claims by patients seeking damages for injuries suffered
as a result of negligent utilization review.4 The same day
the Supreme Court decided Davila, U.S. Representative
John Dingell (D-MI), then ranking Democrat on the
House Committee on Energy and Commerce, announced
that he would introduce a patients' bill of rights in the
House, stating that "HMOs, foreign diplomats and the
mentally insane are the only people in this country who
are exempt from the consequences of their decisions."5
His bill, which would have given ERISA-regulated
plan beneficiaries the right to sue their HMO without
limitations on damages, never became law. 6 However,
Rep. Dingell's words represented, and still represent, the
feelings of many legislators, judges, and commentators
that the Court's current ERISA jurisprudence unjustly
denies average Americans who suffer injuries as a result
of a wrongful denial of coverage by their HMO the right
to recover damages for their injuries. 7 More than ten years
before the Davila decision, one U.S. Senator described
the effects of ERISA during a committee debate in the
following terms:
Under current law, states can do nothing to ensure that
insurance companies act fairly. When an insurance
company denies a claim, an individual has little hope
of finding an attorney to take his or her case. For the
few who do succeed in retaining an attorney, all they
can hope for is that after two or three years of court
action their claim will be paid, but with no damages.'
The Court's unanimous decision in Davila to close the
door to aggrieved ERISA- regulated plan beneficiaries
seeking "make-whole" relief from their HMO makes
this assessment of ERISA even more accurate today than
when first made.

Under the Court's current interpretation of ERISA, an
employee participating in an ERISA-regulated plan can
sue the plan to recover only wrongfully denied benefits,
and not a penny more. 9 Under ERISA, the employee
cannot recover damages for injuries resulting from her
HMO's negligent denial of coverage.' 0 Moreover, after
Davila, it is clear that ERISA preempts any state law
claim that the employee could raise against the HMO
to recover for her injuries." This leaves the employee
with no option but to raise a claim under ERISA's civil
enforcement provisions and to hope to at least receive
denied benefits.' 2 As Justice Ginsburg expressed in
her concurrent opinion in Davila, the Court's current
ERISA jurisprudence leaves a "regulatory vacuum"
where "virtually all state law remedies are preempted
but very few federal substitutes are provided." 3
Some commentators see the Davila decision as the
Court's final statement to Congress that addressing the
"regulatory vacuum" left by ERISA is the responsibility
of the legislature, not the courts.' 4 Others, however,
express hope that the Court, as Justice Ginsburg
anticipates in her concurring opinion, will eventually
revise the current interpretation of ERISA's remedial
scheme to allow aggrieved patients to obtain makewhole relief from their HMO.'
This article seeks to assess the effects of the Davila
decision on the ability of ERISA-plan participants and
beneficiaries to obtain relief for a wrongful denial of
benefits by their HMO. Part II provides an introduction
to the relevant ERISA provisions and how the Court has
interpreted them. Part III analyzes the Court's holding
in Davila and discusses the legal and socioeconomic
effects of the decision. This article concludes that the
Davila decision closed the door on plan participants
and beneficiaries seeking to recover damages from
their HMO for injuries caused by the HMO's negligent
denial of benefits. Based on this conclusion, Part IV
calls on Congress to amend ERISA so as to allow the
states to narrow the regulatory gap left by the Court's
current ERISA jurisprudence through patients' rights
legislation.
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conduct, responsibility, and obligation for fiduciaries
of employee benefit plans, and by providing for
appropriate remedies, sanctions, and ready access
to the Federal courts."' 6 Congress was responding
to long-ignored claims by American workers that
their employers were recklessly underfunding their
pension plans and creating unnecessary obstacles to
full benefits eligibility.' Although Congress enacted
ERISA primarily to protect private employee pension
plans,'" ERISA also covers employee welfare plans.' 9
A "welfare plan" under ERISA is "any plan, fund, or
program ... established or maintained by an employer
or by an employee organization. . . for the purpose of
providing for its participants or their beneficiaries ...
medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits," among
other benefits. 2 0 Section 502(a) of ERISA allows
welfare plan participants and beneficiaries to bring a
civil action in federal court to protect their interests in

the plan.2 1
In order to "promote uniformity and avoid inconsistent
state regulation of pension benefits," 22 Congress
included an express preemption clause in Section 514
of ERISA.2 3 Section 514(a) provides that ERISA shall
supersede any state law that "relate[s] to any employee
benefit plan." 24 Section 514(b)(2)(A), however, carves
out an exception to ERISA preemption, stating that
"nothing in [ERISA] shall be construed to exempt or
relieve any person from any law of any State which
regulates insurance . . . ."25 Section 514(b)(2)(A),
which is commonly known as the "savings clause,"
has, in turn, its own exception.26 Section 514(b)(2)(B),
called the "deemer clause," provides that no "employee
benefit plan . . . shall be deemed to be an insurance
company or other insurer . . . or to be engaged in the

business of insurance ... for purposes of any law of any
State purporting to regulate insurance companies [or]
insurance contracts .. ."2 7 Thus, ERISA preempts state
laws that "relate to any employee benefit plan," except
those state laws that regulate insurance, but no employee
benefit plan can itself be considered an insurer.
Among the civil actions that ERISA-regulated plan
participants and beneficiaries can bring under Section
502(a) is an action to hold ERISA-regulated plan
fiduciaries liable for a breach of their fiduciary duties to
the plan.2 8 The Court, however, has held that HMOs do
not act as fiduciaries for purposes of ERISA when they
make mixed eligibility and treatment decisions, thus
limiting the scope of this cause of action. 29

Section 502(a) allows an ERISA-plan participant or
beneficiary to bring a civil action in federal court "to
recover benefits due to him under the terms of his
plan, or to enforce ... or ... clarify his rights to future
benefits under the terms of the plan."30 A participant
or beneficiary can also bring a civil action "to enjoin
any act or practice which violates any provision of
[ERISA] or the terms of the plan, or to obtain other
appropriate equitable relief."3' The Court has viewed
section 502(a) as providing for ERISA-regulated plan
participants and beneficiaries a total of "six carefully
integrated civil enforcement provisions,"3 2 which
"represent a careful balancing of the need for prompt
and fair claims settlement procedures against the public
interest in encouraging the formation of employee
benefit plans." 33
Section 502(a) preempts any state law that "duplicates,
supplements, or supplants" its civil enforcement
provisions .34
This section derives its preemptive
power from the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution,
which resolves conflicts between state and federal
laws in favor of the later.3 5 When federal legislation
is substantially broad in one particular area, it is said
that such legislation "occupies the field" in question
to the exclusion of state law, even when this exclusive
"occupation" leaves a "regulatory vacuum." 36 When
this happens, the federal statute invalidates even state
laws that are consistent with its provisions. 3 7 The Court
explained in Davila that Section 502(a) of ERISA falls
within this category of federal legislation, and therefore,
completely preempts even state laws attempting
to provide only additional remedies not available
under ERISA. 3 8 The Court noted that this complete
preemption arises from Congress's clear intent to make
ERISA's "comprehensive civil enforcement scheme"
exclusive. 39 The Court reasoned that "[t]he policy
choices reflected in the inclusion of certain remedies
and the exclusion of others .

.

. would be completely

undermined if ERISA-regulated plan participants and
beneficiaries were free to obtain remedies under state
law that Congress rejected in ERISA."4 0
Section 502(a) preemption automatically removes
to federal court any cause of action that could have
been brought under any of its provisions. 4' The Court
has explained that section 502(a)'s preemptive force
"converts [even] an ordinary common law complaint
into one stating a federal claim." 42 Justice Thomas,
writing for the Court in Davila, summarized Section
502(a)'s preemptive effect in the following: "if an
individual, at some point in time, could have brought
his claim under ERISA Section 502(a)(1)(B), and where

there is no other independent legal duty that is implicated
by a defendant's actions, then the individual's cause of
action is completely preempted."43

supplanting ERISA regulation of employee welfare
plans with state regulation." Congress thus added the
"deemer clause" in Section 514, which provides that no
"employee benefit plan .
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In addition to Section 502(a), ERISA preemption finds
support in Section 514(a), which provides that "the
provisions of [ERISA] shall supersede any and all State
laws insofar as they. . . relate to any employee benefit
plan." 44 Before New York State Conference of Blue
Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co.,45 the
Court interpreted the "relate to" language of section 514
very broadly, so that a state law was found to "relate to"
an employee benefit plan "if it ha[d] a connection with
or reference to such a plan." 46 Following this approach,
the Court found ERISA preemption even of state laws
that "merely exert[ed] some effect, however indirect,
on employee benefit plans." 47 In Travelers, however,
the Court realized that a textualist interpretation of
Section 514(a)'s "relate to" did not reflect legislative
intent because "if 'relate to' were taken to extend to the
furthest stretch of indeterminacy, then for all practical
purposes pre-emption would never run its course." 48
The Court thus decided to look beyond the language of
Section 514(a) to interpret this section in light of the
congressional objective of preventing a "multiplicity
of regulation in order to permit the nationally uniform
administration of employee benefit plans." 49 Although
the Travelers Court did not elaborate a clear rule to
determine what state laws "relate to" employee benefit
plans for ERISApurposes, it observed that in prior cases
"ERISA pre-empted state laws that mandated employee
benefit structures or their administration" and "laws
50
providing alternative enforcement mechanisms."
In the "savings clause," Congress provided an exception
to Section 514(a) preemption for state laws that regulate
insurance.5 ' Congress did so in part because insurance
had historically been, and still remains, an area subject
to state regulation, and in part to preserve the complex
systems of insurance regulation the states had in place. 52
In Kentucky Ass 'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller,53 the
Court developed a two-prong test to determine whether
a state law regulates insurance for purposes of ERISA
Section 514.5 First, the Court asks whether the state
law in question is "specifically directed toward entities
engaged in insurance." 5 Second, the Court determines
whether such law "substantially affects the risk pooling
arrangement between the insurer and the insured." 5 6
Although Congress was willing to "save" a state law
that regulates insurance from ERISA preemption, it felt
that the scope of state insurance regulation had to be
curtailed in some way in order to prevent states from

.

. shall be deemed to be an

insurance company or other insurer ... or to be engaged
in the business of insurance ... for purposes of any law
of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies
[or] insurance contracts .. ..
In Metro. Life Ins. Co.
v. Massachusetts59 the Court interpreted the "deemer
clause" as effectively removing employer self-funded
welfare plans from the scope of the "savings clause"
and placing them beyond state regulation and within
ERISA.6 0

~
C ~ ran:Hric"AndFiduc-iary
Act s Under-ERS
ERISA Section 409 provides in part that "any person who
is a fiduciary with respect to an [employee benefits] plan
who breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations, or
duties imposed upon fiduciaries by [ERISA] shall be
personally liable to make good to such plan any losses
... resulting from each such breach." 62 In Pegram, the
Court faced the issue of whether a treatment decision
made by an HMO physician constituted a fiduciary act
under ERISA, thus subjecting the HMO to potential
liability under ERISA Section 409.63 Cynthia Herdrich,
an ERISA plan beneficiary, suffered injuries when her
treating physician, Dr. Lori Pegram, an HMO employee,
required her to wait eight days to have an abdominal
ultrasound performed at a facility staffed by the HMO
located 50 miles away.64 While waiting, Herdrich's
appendix burst, causing peritonitis.6 5 She brought suit
against Dr. Pegram and the HMO, claiming medical
malpractice and fraud.66 Defendants removed the case
to federal court under ERISA. 67 Herdrich then amended
her complaint to include a claim for breach of fiduciary
duty under ERISA Section 409.68
The Court declared that the "threshold question" in
analyzing claims for breach of fiduciary duty under
ERISA is "not whether the actions of some person
employed to provide services under a plan adversely
affected a plan beneficiary's interest, but whether
that person was acting as a fiduciary, in that it was
69
The
performing a fiduciary function to complaint."
Court held that while pure eligibility decisions (decisions
regarding coverage of medical treatment under an
employee welfare plan) are strictly administrative and
thus fiduciary in nature, mixed treatment and eligibility
decisions do not qualify as fiduciary decisions for
purposes ofERISA. 70 The Court argued that as a practical
mailer, it is almost impossible to separate the eligibility
and treatment aspects of a mixed eligibility-treatment
decision.' The Court also feared that ERISA-regulated

plan participants and beneficiaries may disguise medical malpractice claims
as claims for breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA to reach the HMO in
addition to the physician. 72 Allowing mixed eligibility-treatment decisions
would therefore mix state malpractice claims and federal ERISA actions,
creating uncertainty and confusion in the law.73 The Court found that Dr.
Pegram's decision to make Herdrich wait eight days for her ultrasound was
a mixed decision, not made in a fiduciary capacity. 74 Therefore, the Court
held that Herdrich could not bring a breach of fiduciary duty claim against
the HMO under ERISA.75

In Davila the Supreme Court consolidated two cases brought by ERISAregulated plan participants/beneficiaries against their respective HMO
under the Texas Health Care Liability Act (THCLA). 76 THCLA, which
was part of the first state patients' bill of rights in American history, was
intended to protect beneficiaries of managed care organizations (MCOs),
including HMOs, from wrongful denials of benefits. 77 THCLA required
HMOs and health insurance carriers "to exercise ordinary care when
making health care treatment decisions," and subjected them to liability
"for damages for harm to an insured or enrollee proximately caused by [the
HMO's or insurance carrier's] failure to exercise such ordinary care." 7 8 In
both cases the plaintiffs sought to recover damages for injuries allegedly
9
resulting from their HMO's negligent denial of coverage. 7

A, Factiu Ifa",%ackgroIAund
Juan Davila, an ERISA-regulated plan participant, suffered from arthritis.
His physician prescribed Vioxx to treat his arthritis pain, but Aetna Health
Inc. (Aetna), which administered Davila's health benefits plan, refused to
pay for the drug.s0 Aetna based its decision on the grounds that Davila's
plan provided that Aetna would pay for Vioxx only if no other equivalent
drug in Aetna's formulary was suited for treating a participant's condition.8 '
Davila then began taking the genetic drug Naprosyn, which Aetna covered.
However, this drug caused him to experience internal bleeding and he was
rushed to the hospital, where he spent days in critical care.82 As a result
of his reaction to Naprosyn, Davila became incapable of receiving any
medication via his digestive track. 83
A related case involved Rudy Calad, a beneficiary of an ERISA-regulated
plan administered by CIGNA. 84 After Calad underwent a complicated
hysterectomy, a CIGNA discharge nurse certified her stay in the hospital
for only one day following surgery. 5 The CIGNA discharge nurse decided
that only a one-day stay was "medically necessary" despite Calad's
treating physician's recommendations that she remain in the hospital for
an extended period. 86 Following her discharge, Calad experienced post
8
surgery complications and returned to the hospital.

Davila and Calad brought separate suits against their respective HMOs
in Texas State Court, claiming that the HMOs had violated their "duty to
exercise ordinary care when making health care treatment decisions" under
THCLA for the denied coverage for Davila's drug and Calad's extended
hospital stay.8 " Defendants removed both cases to federal district courts on
the theory that petitioners' causes of actions were preempted under ERISA
Section 502(a). 89 The district courts agreed with the defendant's argument,

and refused to remand the cases to state court. 90 Both Davila and Calad
failed to amend their respective complaints to state claims under ERISA
and the district courts dismissed their complaints with prejudice. 9 1
Davila and Calad appealed the decisions of the district court, and the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit consolidated the cases along with
others raising similar issues. 92 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that ERISA
completely preempts state law causes of action that "duplicat[e] or fal[l]
within the scope of an ERISA § 502(a) remedy." 93 The panel further
observed that only two provisions of ERISA Section 502(a) might preempt
the claims brought by Davila and Calad: "§ 502(a)(1)(B), which provides a
cause of action for the recovery of wrongfully denied benefits, and § 502(a)
(2), which allows suit against a plan fiduciary for breaches of fiduciary duty
to the plan." 94 Relying on the Supreme Court analysis in Pegram stating
that mixed eligibility-treatment decisions are not fiduciary decisions under
ERISA, the panel found that the HMOs' decisions were of the mixed type,
and therefore neither Davila nor Calad could have brought their claims
under Section 502(a)(2).95 The panel also determined that neither plaintiff
could have brought claims under Section 502(a)(1)(B) because their
THCLA claims were basically tort claims while the remedies that Section
502(a)(1)(B) provides are contractual in nature. 96 The panel reasoned that
Davila and Calad were not trying to obtain reimbursement for benefits
denied them, but instead were seeking tort damages based on "an external,
statutorily imposed duty of 'ordinary care.'"97
The Supreme Court granted certiorarion November 3, 2003.98 At the time,
a circuit split had become apparent. On one hand, the Eleventh Circuit
and the Second Circuit held in Land v. CIGNA Healthcare of Florida99
and Cicio v. Does'00 respectively that an HMO's decision to deny coverage
for a particular type of medical treatment based on a finding by the HMO
that such treatment was not medically necessary constituted a mixed
eligibility-treatment decision, and therefore, was not subject to Section
502(a) preemption.101 On the other hand, the Third Circuit in DiFelice v.
02
Aetna U.S. Healthcarel'
found complete preemption in the same kind of

scenario.10 3

C.Te SuP ree Curt )Decision11'1
The Court found that ERISA preempted Davila and Calad's THCLA claims
and therefore reversed the decision of the Fifth Circuit.104
The
Court
discussed ERISA's role as a comprehensive federal statute intended to
"provide a uniform regulatory regime over employee benefit plans." 0 5
The Court emphasized that Congress designed ERISA so as to ensure that
the regulation of employee benefit plans would be a matter "exclusively
of federal concern." 06 The Court considered the Fifth Circuit's reliance
on Rush PrudentialHMO, Inc. v. Morano 7 and its conclusion that ERISA
preempted only those causes of action that "duplicat[e] or fal[1] within
the scope of an ERISA §502(a) remedy." 08 It rejected the Fifth Circuit's
formulation of the holding in Rush Prudential,observing that "nowhere in
Rush Prudentialdid we suggest that the pre-emptive force of ERISA 502(a)
is limited to the situation in which a state cause of action precisely duplicates
a cause of action under ER{ISA 502(a)."109 The Ciourt instead set forth the
rule that "any state-law cause of action that duplicates, supplements, or
supplants the ERISA civil enforcement remedy conflicts with the clear
congressional intent to make the ERISA remedy exclusive and is therefore
pre-empted.""10 In order for Davila and Calad's causes of action to escape

ERISA preemption, they must allege a violation of a
legal duty arising independently of ERISA.111
The Court rejected the Court of Appeals' reasoning
that Davila and Calad's claims did not fall within the
scope of ERISA Section 502(a)(1)(B) because they
sought tort damages, so their claims did not duplicate the
contractual remedies available under that section.112 The
Court viewed as immaterial the distinction between tort
damages under THCLA and contractual remedies under
ERISA on which the Fifth Circuit relied." 3 The Court
reasoned that determining which claims ERISApreempts
on the basis of this distinction would "elevate form over
substance and allow parties to evade' the pre-emptive
scope of ERISA simply 'by relabeling their contract
claims as claims for tortuous breach of contract."'114

the HMO for breach of fiduciary duty, thus ERISA
preempted their THCLA claims.' 23

Justice Ginsburg's concurrence, which Justice Breyer
joined, was concerned primarily with adding yet another
voice to "the rising judicial chorus urging that Congress
and [this] Court revisit what is an unjust and increasingly
tangled ERISA regime."' 24 Although she explained that
she joined the majority opinion because it was consistent
with the Court's prior ERISA cases, Justice Ginsburg
expressed concerned about the "regulatory vacuum"
left by ERISA.125 She discussed very briefly three cases
where the Court limited the amount of damages available
to aggrieved ERISA-regulated plan beneficiaries.' 2 6 She
mentioned Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
The Court found that the duty that THCLA imposed upon Russell,12 7 where the Court held that anERISA-regulated
the HMOs was not independent of ERISA because the plan beneficiary could not recover extra-contractual or
HMOs would have been liable under THCLA only due punitive damages in an action for breach of fiduciary
to the fact that the HMOs administered ERISA-regulated
duty under ERISA Section 409(a), and expressed
plans.1"5 Because "interpret[ing] the terms of respondents' reluctance about allowing extra-contractual or punitive
benefit plans form[ed] an essential part of [Davila and
damages under other sections of ERISA.128 The second
Calad's] THCLA claim," their claims depended on the case she discussed was Mertens v. Hewitt Associates,129
status of the HMOs as administrators of ERISAplans and in which the Court held that "appropriate equitable
therefore did not arise independently of ERISA.116 The relief' in ERISA Section 502(a)(3) does not include
Court concluded that Davila and Calad's THCLA claims
money damages.13 0 The third case was Great-West Life
sought "to rectify a wrongful denial of benefits promised
& Annuity Insurance Co. v. Knudson,131 where the Court
under ERISA-regulated plans, and [did] not attempt reiterated that Section 502(a)(3) does not allow money
to remedy any violation of a legal duty independent
damages as "appropriate equitable relief."1 32 After
of ERISA."" 7 The Court held that Davila and Calad's
reviewing the above cases, Justice Ginsburg extended
claims fell "within the scope of ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B)
an invitation to the Court to reconsider allowing extra... and are therefore completely pre-empted by ERISA contractual damages under ERISA, stating that "[a]s the
§ 502 and removable to federal district court."" 8
array of lower court cases and opinions documents ...
The Court also found that the HMOs' decisions in these fresh consideration of the availability of consequential
33
cases were pure-eligibility decisions, and therefore the damages under § 502(a)(3) is plainly in order."1 She
HMOs were acting as fiduciaries when they made these even provided a specific example of a situation where34
allowed under ERISA.1
decisions." 9 The Court reiterated its holding in Pegram consequential damages may be
She
suggested
that
although
the Court's current
thatmixed eligibility-treatment decisions do not constitute
interpretation
of
ERISA
Section
502(a)(3) does not
20
fiduciary decisions for purposes of ERISA.1 The Court,
allow
consequential
damages
against
a non-fiduciary,
however, narrowed its Pegram decision by suggesting
this section may be interpreted as allowing "at least
that Pegram applied only to situations in which "the
some forms of 'make-whole' relief against a breaching
underlying negligence also plausibly constitutes medical
fiduciary
in light of the general availability of such relief
maltreatment by a party who can be deemed to be a
at the time" ERISA was enacted.135
equity
in
2
treating physician or such a physician's employer."' '
The Court distinguished the decisions made by the
HMO in Pegram, where through its physician-employee
the HMO decided both what treatment to provide for The effects of Davilago far beyond the holding in the case.
Atthe very leastthere is aconsensus among commentators
the patient and whether such treatment was covered,
from the decisions made by the Davila HMOs, which that Davila closed all the doors to ERISA-regulated plan
involved a determination of medical necessity for the beneficiaries seeking money damages under state law
purpose of deciding whether the treatment or procedure for injuries resulting from a wrongful denial of benefits
36
This consensus is well-founded.
at issue was covered under the plan. 22 Therefore, the by their HMO.
Courts
interpreting
ERISA preemption after Davila
Court concluded, Davila and Calad could have brought
have
consistently
found
in favor of preemption.137 Only
claims under ERISA Sections 502(a) and 409(a) against

months after the Supreme Court issued its decision in
Davila, the Fourth Circuit found ERISA preemption of
a claim brought by a plan beneficiary against her HMO
alleging medical malpractice and wrongful death.'3 8 In
Kuthy v. Mansheim, a husband accused his wife's HMO
of committing medical malpractice when it failed to
approve an experimental bone marrow transplant that
his wife's treating physician had recommended.13 9 The
wife died of non-Hodgkin's lymphoma.14 0 Relying on
Davila, the Court of Appeals held that the claim did not
arise independently of the ERISA-regulated plan and
was therefore preempted.141
The Third Circuit also relied onDavilato hold in favor of
ERISA preemption of a claim based on Pennsylvania's
"bad faith" statute.142 In Barber v. Unum Life Insurance
Co., an ERISA-regulated plan participant sought to
recover punitive damages from his HMO, alleging that
the HMO terminated his disability benefits in violation
of Pennsylvania's "bad faith" statute.143 The Court of
Appeals, invoking the Supreme Court reasoning in
Davila, dismissed the State's "bad faith" claim on the
basis that it allowed damages beyond those available
under ERISA Section 502(a)'s exclusive remedial

scheme.144
After Davila, the Eleventh Circuit revisited Land v.
CIGNA Healthcare of Florida on remand.14 5 In Land,
the plaintiff, an ERISA-regulated plan participant,
sued the HMO alleging negligence in the treatment of
a hand infection which resulted in the amputation of a
finger.146 Before Davila, the Eleventh Circuit decided
the case against ERISA preemption, holding that the
claim arose out of a mixed eligibility-treatment decision
by the HMO.147 On remand from the Supreme Court
after Davila, however, the Eleventh Circuit found that
the claim sought only "to remedy the denial of benefits
under an ERISA-regulated benefit plan," and held in
favor of preemption.148
The Fifth Circuit also had the opportunity to address
ERISA preemption after Davila. In Mayeaux v.
Louisiana Health Service & Indemnity Co., a patient
and her treating physician sued the patient's insurer
under state tort law to recover for the denial of coverage
for an experimental treatment. 49 The court rejected
the plaintiffs' argument that the HMO's decision was
a mixed eligibility-treatment decision. 5 o Relying on
Davila, the court explained that the narrow exception
that the Supreme Court carved out for mixed decisions
in Pegram applied only in situations where the treating
physician performed a dual role as health provider
and plan administrator.'5 ' The court held in favor of

preemption.152
The Tenth Circuit has also relied onDavilato find ERISA
preemption of state law claims seeking damages for

injuries resulting from a wrongful denial of benefits.' 53
In Lind v. Aetna Health, Inc., an HMO utilization
review doctor decided to discontinue coverage of a
drug for multiple sclerosis before the patient first tried
a "step drug," despite the vociferous protest from the
treating physician. 54 The patient brought, among
others, a claim of medical negligence based on a theory
of respondeat superior against the HMO, and sought
punitive damages.'"' The plaintiff argued that the claim
of respondeat superior medical malpractice fell outside
the scope of Davila, because a doctor employed by
Aetna "made the determination that Ritalin rather than
Provigil was the appropriate drug to treat [plaintiff's
multiple sclerosis]" and that "Aetna then imposed this
determination upon [plaintiff's] treating physician."1 56
The court rejected this argument, explaining that the
Aetna doctor was not providing treatment for the plaintiff
and there was "no agency relationship between [the
treating physician]-an outside provider-and Aetna
for the purposes of prescribing medication."' 57 The
court found that plaintiff's "medical negligence claim
is unavoidably linked to, and is therefore preempted by,
ERISA." 58
The Seventh Circuit has also joined those jurisdictions
relying on Davila to find ERISA preemption of state
law causes of action for damages against HMOs. In
McDonaldv.HouseholdInt'l,Inc.,anHMOadministering
an ERISA plan failed to properly activate an employee's
health insurance.159 Unable to afford his blood pressure
medication, he did not take the drugs he needed and, as
a result, suffered a stroke.1 60 The employee brought a
number of state law claims against the HMO, alleging
that it "committed acts of gross negligence, willful or
wanton misconduct, or intentional wrongs that led to
[the employee's] lack of health coverage and ultimately
to the stroke."161 The court found that the facts of this
case were significantly similar to those of Davila and
2
held that ERISA preempted the employee's claims.16
As the above cases indicate, commentators are right to
conclude that Davila put a definite stop to all attempts
by ERIISA-regulated plan beneficiaries to obtain "makewhole" relief under state law for injuries caused by
their HMO's negligence, and in some cases, one may
argue, intentional denial of benefits. 63 Davila erected.
or rather, finished or solidified a wall of protection
around HMOs with dire consequences to the average
middle-class American employee receiving health
care benefits through an ERISA-regulated plan. On
one hand, the wide regulatory gap left by the Supreme
Court's interpretation of ERISA preemption creates
an economic incentive for HMOs to wrongfully deny
benefits to ERISA-regulated plan beneficiaries. On the
other hand, Justice Thomas' subtle recommendation
in Davila that an employee in a situation in which her

HMO wrongfully denies benefits can pay out of pocket
and then sue the HMO under ERISA to recover for the
denied benefits does not constitute a viable alternative
for the average American. 6 4 The average American
employee most likely does not have enough out-ofpocket money to pay for medical expenses when
faced with a wrongful denial of benefits. Although
Justice Ginsburg's concurrent opinion leaves open the
possibility of a turnaround in the Court's approach
to ERISA's remedial scheme, and suggests allowing
some form of make-whole relief under ERISA Section
502(a), the fact that only Justice Breyer joined Justice
Ginsburg's opinion makes this possibility look distant

at best.16 5
The Supreme Court's current ERISA jurisprudence
not only leaves a wide gap in the regulation of HMOs,
but actually creates incentives for HMOs to defraud
ERISA-regulated plan beneficiaries by intentionally
denying due benefits, or at least to act with less than
ordinary care in making utilization review decisions.' 66
ERISA preemption provides HMOs with broad
immunity to state law causes of action brought by
ERISA-regulated plan participants attempting to obtain
damages for injuries resulting from a wrongful denial of
benefits.' 67 All that these aggrieved ERISA-regulated
plan participants can do is sue the HMO under ERISA
and obtain an injunction against the HMO or recover the
cost of wrongfully denied benefits.' 6 8 Thus, because the
only risk of refusing to pay for some medical treatment
or procedure for an ERISA-regulated plan participant
is to have to eventually pay for such treatment or
procedure, it makes good business sense for HMOs
to at the very least, err on the side of denying benefits
covered under the plan when making utilization review
decisions.' 69 Considering the hassles and high costs of
litigation, chances are that the sick or recovering patient
will not even sue.170
Another potential effect of the Davila decision is to move
medical treatment decision-making from the treating
physician to the HMO.' 7 While affirming its decision
in Pegram that mixed treatment-eligibility decisions
made by the treating physician are not fiduciary in
nature and, therefore, fall outside the scope of ERISA,
the Davila Court held that when ERISA-regulated plan
administrators make "medical necessity" decisions in
order to determine eligibility, they act as fiduciaries for
purposes of ERISA. 72 Thus, "a wrongful decision to
deny care is now significantly less costly when made by
a plan administrator rather than a treating physician."7
This "liability imbalance," coupled with the HMOs'
sticks and carrots directed at physicians to discourage
over-utilization,17 4 may encourage physicians to leave
certain medical decisions, particularly treatment
decisions, in the hands of the HMO by recommending

every possible "adequate" treatment and letting the
HMO decide which one is "covered" under the plan.'7
These incentives for the HMO to disregard patients'
rights, and for the treating physician to "delegate"
treatment decisions to the HMO, operate, of course,
to the detriment of patients. In the best scenario,
patients receive lesser-quality health care in the form
of less-than-optimal treatment.176 In the worst scenario,
patients find themselves in a situation like that of the
patients in Davila, in which most needed treatment is
wrongfully denied and no alternative is provided, or
the alternative treatment results in severe injuries to the
patient.' 77 Patients who find themselves in the second
type of situation often do not have the money to pay
for the needed treatment or procedure out of pocket. In
this type of situation, therefore, a wrongful denial of
coverage by the HMO constitutes in practice a denial
of treatment.

The Court's unanimous decision in Davila should send

a strong message to Congress that the courts are not up
to the job of fixing the regulatory gap left by ERISA
preemption any time in the near future.'7 It is now time
for Congress to hear "the rising judicial chorus urging
that Congress and [the] Court revisit what is an unjust
and increasingly tangled ERISA regime."179 Congress
should undertake thejob of amending ERISAto eliminate
ERISA preemption of state law actions brought patients
against their HMOs to recover consequential damages
for injuries caused by negligent denials of benefits.
On various occasions, Congress has unsuccessfully
attempted to pass a patients' bill of rights.8 0 In 2001,
both the Senate and the House passed different versions
of a patients' bill of rights."' The Senate's version of the
bill called for "extensive new opportunities to challenge
decisions by health maintenance organizations and
insurers-including a two-tiered review process-and,
if a patient remains unsatisfied, a right to sue insurers
and HMOs over decisions that lead to injury or
death." 82 The Congressional effort, however, came to
an end in the midst of confrontations between Congress
and the White House over "whether federal rules or
stronger state rules w'~ould gov em patients' appeals." 83
The bill was reintroduced in 2004 by Senator Barbara
A. Boxer (D-CA), but died after the Senate Committee
on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions failed to
take action on it.' 84 Since the Court issued its decision
in Davila, Representative John Dingell has twice
introduced legislation giving patients the right to sue
their insurers and HMOs, but both bills failed to attract
much legislative attention."' Some commentators have
expressed hope that after the Democratic takeover of
both the House and the Senate in 2006, Congress will

attempt to pass patients' rights legislation.18 6
Whether having a federal comprehensive patients' bill of rights is a good
idea is beyond the scope of this article. Patients' rights legislation, such
as THCLA, has pros and cons."' While it allows patients to recover
consequential damages from their HMOs for breach of a duty to exercise
ordinary care in making treatment decisions might encourage responsible
utilization review and promote equity in plan coverage by protecting
vulnerable patients, such legislation may also result in increased risks for
HMOs and higher health care prices.'"' The ultimate effects of patients'
rights laws are largely unknown.18 9 Fortunately, "the federalist structure
of the American government is well-suited to handle such issues."1 9 0
As Justice Brandeis put it in his famous dissent in New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann,191 "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a
single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory;
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of
the country."1 92 But the unhappy incident of ERISA preemption is that
states cannot serve as laboratories for patients' rights laws.193 The Court
in Davila closed the door to such experimentation.19 4 As one commentator
eloquently put it:
The Davila/Caladholding precludes a federalist experiment on remedies
against HMOs. States may not test and compare the benefits and
disadvantages of tort liability statutes or other types of remedies. States
must accept the ERISA Section 502 remedies as exclusive. Davila/
Calad undercuts one of the significant strengths of the American form of
government-a strength that is well- designed to address the very problems
that motivated ERISA's passage.19 5
Congress should take action to amend ERISA to allow the laboratory of the
states to test the efficacy of patients' rights laws.

Ik"Conclu."sion
The Supreme Court's decision in Davila closed the door on patients seeking
state tort law damages from their HMO for injuries suffered as a result of
a wrongful denial of benefits by the HMO.196 After Davila, it is clear that
ERISA preempts state laws designed to protect patients from intentional or
negligent denials of benefits by their HMOs and leaves patients without the
possibility of obtaining "make-whole" relief for injuries suffered as a result
of such denials.197 The unanimity of the decision suggests that the Court is
unlikely to change the course of its ERISA jurisprudence anytime soon.198
For these reasons, Congress should take action to amend ERISA to correct
the regulatory gap left by the Court's interpretation of ERISA preemption.
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